Lockheed's Senior Peg: The Forgotten Stealth Bomber

Perhaps because it was built in secret and designed to be invisible, the stealth bomber is unforgettable the moment you see it. What few remember, though, is that the iconic silhouette almost looked like this. Here's the story of how Senior Peg came to be, why we didn't get it, and why we might want it back.

Some aircraft are so notorious that they require no introduction — the P-51 Mustang and F-14 Tomcat are as much a part of pop culture as they are a part of military
history. Yet there is one aircraft that is so identifiable and so intimidating that once you see it for the first time two simple words are forever etched in your mind: STEALTH BOMBER.

It is the most expensive and complex intra-atmospheric flying
machine ever built. This big boomerang
of death and destruction remains so futuristic looking that it is almost impossible to believe that it has
been invisibly prowling the world's skies for two and a half decades. The
unique and downright breathtaking shape of B-2 is such a common fixture on the
walls of grade school boys across the country that it is hard to imagine that America's
beloved "stealth bomber" could have been any different than the one we have
come to respect and our enemies have come to fear. Yet the truth is that the USAF's bat winged masterpiece could have had a stubby tail, a faceted windscreen and a Lockheed Skunk
Works logo on the control yoke..

Stealth technology slithered from near-obscurity to the dark
shadows of America's top secret aircraft design houses in the mid 1970's. A
small but growing group within the Pentagon's Advanced Research Projects Agency
wanted to explore the possibility of building a tactical aircraft that appeared
as close to invisible as possible on radar. This initiative gelled into the eXperimental
Survivable Tactical (XST) competition, which would lay down the stealth
gauntlet to America's top military aircraft designers. The goal was simple,
design a tactical aircraft concept that could all but disappear on radar, a tall order during a time when even predicting the radar reflectivity of basic shapes was challenging. In the end,
Lockheed's Skunk Works "bleeding-edge" boutique design house was pitted against
legendary aircraft manufacturer the Northrop Corporation. The rest is history, and like the Advanced Tactical Bomber program's story,
the loser of that competition may have lost simply because their concept was too far ahead of their time.

For more background before continuing, click here to read about the outcome
of the XST competition, and how it would change aviation and world history forever.

By the later part of the 1970's the Skunk Works team was riding high after winning the XST
competition, and was in the process of testing their resultant "Have Blue" flying technology demonstrator,
the arrow shaped aircraft that was based directly of their game-changing "hopeless diamond"
computer model. Eventually the success of the "Have Blue" aircraft would morph into the F-117A Nighthawk
Stealth Fighter, but there was one more major decision that the USAF would have to make
before locking down the final design. There were two "Advanced
Tactical Aircraft" (ATA) proposals that the Skunk Works put forth to the USAF after winning the ATX competition and testing "Have Blue." The "ATA-A" was a fighter sized aircraft with a 450-mile combat radius, one pilot, and a payload of around 5,000lbs. The "ATA-B"
was a larger, "regional bomber" that sported a 1150 mile combat radius, carried
two crew members, and 10,000lbs of precision guided weapons. The ATA-B was
even pitched by the Skunk Works to be a potential replacement for the service's F-111 Aardvark
swing wing medium bombers. In the end the USAF chose the least expensive and lower risk
of the two options, the smaller ATA-A, as they wanted to be able to purchase enough of the jets on the black budget to make the program worthwhile. The result of this key decision was the F-117A "Nighthawk" as
we know it today.

The creative and agile Skunk Works management team, headed
by legendary aircraft designer and the grandfather of stealth design, Ben
Rich, soon went back to the USAF, in this case the Strategic Air Command, and
pitched a tweaked version of their larger ATA-B stealth attack jet to them. The USAF,
and the Carter Administration who had controversially cancelled the B-1A
program in part due to the aforementioned developments in stealth technology, had
the same idea as Ben Rich. In fact the Carter Administration, a big believer in stealth
technology's promise very early on, took a lot of heat for canceling the
troubled B-1A and could not even explain to the press that they were going to
focus on a new breakthrough game changing technology, that being stealth, as it
was so deeply classified at the time.

After a consensus was a made that a stealth bomber was strategically relevant and that is was actually possible to build one, the momentum for the program almost immediately
began to build steam. To the Skunk Works surprise, the USAF did not want something to replace the F-111, they
wanted something to replace the recently sacked B-1A, and even the 1950's vintage B-52. They
wanted a big, long range, hard hitting, heavy bomber... And they wanted it to be as
invisible to radar as the diminutive "Have Blue."

It was a new decade, and as the program that would become
the Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) moved on, two competitors emerged as the
finalists for another winner take all stealth jet competition. The same arch rivals
who competed for the XST program, Northrop and Lockheed's Skunk Works, would be facing off again, and this time around the stakes were huge, both physically and economically. The USAF wanted 132 stealth
bombers in a production run that could last almost 20 years. Both competitors knew that whoever won this competition
could theoretically "own" the USAF's heavy bomber portfolio from about 1990 well into the next millennia, and perhaps forever. With the sheer size of aircraft and the numbers that the USAF was demanding in mind, both teams paired with another manufacturer for production. Skunk Works teamed up with Rockwell, who had just lost the B-1A program, and Northrop teamed up with Boeing.

As a side note, the ATB program was deeply classified, and appeared under the
code name "Aurora" in black budget documents at the time. This name would be used in
relation to a mythical hypersonic spy plane, a supposed successor of the SR-71
Blackbird, for decades to come in the aerospace and defense journalism world, even though there was little evidence or logic to backup the assumption that such a program existed. You have to hand it to those hypersonic Blackbird 2.0 fan
boys, they just want to believe so, so bad...

The Northrop Corporation was still smarting from Lockheed's winning the XST competition, which
allowed them to be "first to the plate" with a production stealth combat jet, the
F-117A. Additionally, Northrop's ability to design low signature aircraft had taken
a quantum leap in the half-decade or so since the XST competition. Aided by computer
modeling and further research, Northrop fielded one of the most incredible,
and misunderstood aircraft of all time, the Battlefield Surveillance Aircraft
eXperimental (BSAX), otherwise known as "Tacit Blue." This experimental and stealthy "alien school bus"
with wings would prove technologies that we are only seeing come to operational fruition in the white world today, some 30 years after its first flight.

Click here to read the story of Tacit Blue, and how it was
the grandfather of the now infamous RQ-170 Sentinel that spied on Bin Laden and
later crash landed right into the Iranians hands
.

On the other side of the Advanced Technical Bomber boxing ring was Lockheed's Skunk Works, which had much
more experience than Northrop in actually putting a stealth aircraft into production and working out the oddities surrounding a stealthy operational aircraft.
Concepts and one-off demonstrators were one thing, building a low observable
aircraft that could be economically fielded, flown and maintained in mass was
an entirely different expertise altogether.

The requirements for new super bomber were outright impressive.
The aircraft had to possess a 6,000 mile unrefueled range and a weapons load
approaching twenty tons. Although extremely low radar reflectivity was
paramount, other signature reduction measures, such as masking the aircraft's infra-red
footprint, had to be designed into the airframe as well. These unique requirements, paired with
the computer processing power at the time, and the realities of plain old
physics, led the teams to venture down similar design paths. In fact, during
the design phase of the program a DoD official involved with the Pentagon's ATB project office saw a
model of Lockheed's concept while at the Skunk Works plant in Burbank, CA and asked how they got their hands on Northrop's
design! The combination of the long range, heavy payload and low observability requirements ended up funneling both teams' design processes into a similar space. This is also an eye opening indication of just how challenging designing an aircraft with these capabilities and aerodynamic demands truly was at the time.

Regardless of similarities, each aircraft was actually quite unique. Lockheed's design was code named "Senior Peg" and Northrop's design was code named "Senior Ice." Senior Peg was clearly a Skunk Works product of the time period, with many features of the F-117A scaled up and blended into a flying wing-like planform. Faceted cockpit windows, and a highly raked frontal fascia with flat upper fuselage segments and mesh covered engine inlets were present. The wings of the aircraft resembled modern unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs) of today, with less sweep then the aircraft's forward fuselage. Yet the most unique thing about Lockheed's flying wing design was that it had a small "V" tail mounted on a short boom that emerged from the back of the fuselage. The concept looked strange to say the least, but it reflected Lockheed's design strategy, to make the aircraft as cheaply and small as possible while still meeting the program's minimum design requirements. In other words, Lockheed thought that the USAF would opt for a numerical advantage over excess capability, as the team had observed such a choice after presenting the ATA-A and ATA-B to the USAF a few years back.

Meanwhile, the Northrop team continued with their ever-improving
understanding of continuous curvature stealth design and decided to build a giant and exotic
flying wing, something that Jack Northrop, the founder of the company, had been infatuated with to detrimental ends for almost a half
century. Some say that when the Northrop management team showed Jack, who was in poor health by the turn of the decade, the model
of their stealth bomber design, he cried with joy.

The flying wing was truly
Jack Northrop's "white whale," and modern computing power had finally caught up
with the flying wing's super-efficient, but somewhat unstable design. Fly-by-wire control systems, where a computer
interprets the pilots commands and then tells the control surfaces what to do in
order to provide the requested result, all the while keeping the inherently unstable
aircraft pointed in the right direction, would allow for the stability issues associated with such designs to be nullified. The Northrop Company's giant flying wing was code named "Senior
Ice" and the concept offered excess payload and range well above the program's minimum requirements. Additionally,
because the aircraft was larger and its control surfaces had much more surface area,
Northrop's design was a true flying wing, allowing it to dispense with any sort
of vertical tail at all. Split "elevons" on the wings, along with differential power
settings according to some reports, allow Northrop's design to compensate for reduced
directional stability and yaw control due to the lack of a tail. The Northrop team, energized by the possibility of making good on the founder of their company's greatest wish, was determined not to lose again to Lockheed.

The competition between the two companies consisted of
documentation that described their design's theoretical capabilities in detail, a series of wind
tunnel tests, and it ended in May of 1981 in a "pole off," just like during the
XST program, where scale models of both designs were tested against radar
emissions at multiple band widths and from multiple aspects. Some say a flight test also occurred
of at least one technology demonstrator from one of the companies involved.
There has even been odd slipups amongst those who were involved with the ATB project who mentioned testing in
the air as well as the ground, although this has never been proven.

Both teams walked away very proud of their designs, but the
contest was clearly closer than the XST competition years before. Then the results were released.
Underdog Northrop was selected to produce the Advanced Technology Bomber.
Lockheed was floored by this as they thought they beat them hands down in radar
testing and their design was cheaper and less risky having leveraged lessons
learned during the then budding F-117 program. Northrop disagreed with Lockheed's complaints, with management saying
that they (Northrop) dominated Lockheed not just for radar cross section (RCS) testing but
also in performance and overall capability.

The tailless Northrop design was more
efficient, with claims of 5-10% better aerodynamic performance, and their rounded
solution for reducing radar reflectivity, born in the XST program and refined
with "Tacit Blue," was seen as more effective against multiple bandwidths of
radar emissions, not just the ones that are the most threatening historically. Additionally, this "broadband" stealth capability, although
less effective than a tailor made aircraft specifically configured to defeat certain radar bands
from certain angles, was thought to be
more resistant to potential future enemy radar capabilities aimed at spotting stealth
aircraft. Northrop also had an advantage over Lockheed when it came to sensor integration for their design. Tacit Blue was basically a nearly invisible flying
radar surveillance platform. Northrop had made great strides not only in
making the aircraft hard to detect, but also making Tacit Blue's radar
emissions near-undetectable. This was a major advantage considering the ATB
would be fielded with hugely powerful radar arrays for targeting. Stealth is worthless
if your radar emissions give your position, or even your presence away. Metaphorically it would be like being
invisible in the middle of a football game while screaming at the top of your
lungs. You may be a little harder to find but with all those alert people on the field it
won't take long till someone hears you.

Finally, Northrop's flying wing was a larger aircraft than Lockheed's, with more range
and payload, but it was also expensive. Very expensive. Lockheed's estimate to put "Senior Peg" into
production was $200 million a copy, a number Ben Rich's Skunk Works team was
very confident with after bringing the F-117 into production. Northrop's bid
was about double that figure. Yet this was during the dawn of the Reagan era, where
defense spending was about to super-nova. During this time of great investment into the US military, the DoD was no longer interested in the "affordable"
solution, they wanted excess capability, even at great cost. Thus, Northrop
would proceed on to produce the B-2 bomber as we know it today.

Looking back, it is hard to say if the USAF's decision was
the right one. The B-2 is an American treasure, but there are only twenty of
the aircraft in inventory, of which the majority are either in maintenance,
sitting nuclear alert, or providing testing duties at any given time. This
abysmal number came from a cocktail of factors. The Air Force added the low
level penetration requirement to the ATB program, resulting in added complexity
and weight to the B-2 design. This also dropped the aircraft's intended ceiling
of around 60,000 feet down to below 50,000 feet. Additionally, the Reagan Administration came
through on their campaign promise and put the B-1 into production in a
slower, but stealthier guise as B-1B, so there was not a pressing need for
the ATB immediately and funds that could have gone into the ATB went to the readily
available B-1B. Then there was Northrop's inexperience in producing a stealth
aircraft in mass. The jet was the most complex aircraft ever built, with thousands
of parts that were uncommon with any aircraft that came before it. Over 3500
subcontractors were providing components to Northrop for the program, which also increased the logistical
complexity of the production line.

As setbacks mounted, the B-2's unit cost climbed. This, combined with the fact that B-1B production was sucking USAF funds at an alarming rate, and there were clear signs that the Cold War may be thawing, led
Congress to cut the B-2 buy to 75 units. This sent the bombers unit cost skyrocketing
towards one billion dollars a copy. By the time the Cold War came to an end,
and the "peace dividend" was all the rage, the final B-2 production number allotted
by Congress was a measly 21 examples. This left the B-2's price tag at a
whopping $2.2B each. This is almost the entire cost of building the Wynn
Resort in Las Vega
s!

Fast forward to today and America is badly in need of a new
heavy "stealth" weapons platform. With the strategic focus moving from the
Middle East to the Pacific theater, a place where distance can be an enemy
itself, and China becoming ever more belligerent in the region, the USAF has
finally prioritized its hunt for a new multi-role long range stealth aircraft. This
semi-secret program has gone through many names like its predecessors.
Originally called the 2018 Bomber, then the Next Generation Bomber, and now
the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B), this aircraft will do much more than strike missions alone. The LRS-B is envisioned as being able to provide deep strike, penetrating
and standoff reconnaissance, electronic intelligence gathering, network and
communications conveyance, standoff attack, nuclear deterrence and possibly jamming duties. If USAF builds this program right, different versions of the LRS-B could potentially do other things as well. In many ways the LRS-B has become a canvas for the USAF brass to paint their wildest dreams upon, and this includes a push to make these advanced aircraft "optionally manned" and even relatively affordable.

Click hear to read about the great potential, and possible
missed opportunities, that the LRS-B represents for the USAF

What is most
interesting when it comes to the LRS-B initiative is that the physical
requirements for the aircraft are said to be more like Lockheed's Senior Peg
then Northrop's B-2A Spirit. For instance, the LRS-B will be smaller than the B-2 and it will
represent lower risk than the B-2 did decades ago. Additionally, the LRS-B is
said to have a smaller weapons payload, around 30,000lbs compared to the B-2's
50,000lbs. The jet will also have about 20% less range, and will utilize more
off the shelf components than the B-2 ever did. Additionally, its design will be modular so that different capabilities can be fitted for different missions and upgrades later in its service like will be less costly. In other words, the USAF is trying
buy their new bomber on a minimal requirements basis in order to get the total production run up
and thus the unit price down. The is exactly what Lockheed's Skunk Works prioritized
in their Senior Peg concept, a gamble that lost them the rights to build the LRS-B's predecessor.

With all this in mind, one really has to ask the question: Did
the USAF make the right decision some thirty plus years ago when it bought Northrop's stealth bomber instead of the Skunk Works' model? Would we still only have
20 stealth bombers (one was lost in a crash while on tour in Guam a few years ago) if the USAF
selected the less risky and much less expensive, albeit less visually striking,
Senior Peg? Would we really even need an LRS-B at this time if we actually had
a much larger fleet of ATBs? Often times when one views these large weapon
system competitions in retrospect, the loser looks much more enticing than the
winner just on original concept alone, not on conjecture. Although the B-2 is a
marvelous machine, actually it should be considered a national treasure due to its scarcity and its
unique ability to put our enemies at risk anywhere and at any time around the globe, but it may
have been a frivolous choice in retrospect considering we are now requesting
the same basic specs and affordability out of our new bomber that the Skunk
Works offered decades ago.

Like the YF-23 that came a decade after Senior Peg was
relegated to the very bottom of ash heap of military and aviation history, we
can only look back and wonder what could have been. Although we have the
crystal ball of time on our side, it is sad that our forces have paid for these
retrospectively questionable procurement decision for decades after they are
made. Would we be better off today with an F-23A, a super fighter that had longer
range, higher sustained super-cruise speed and a smaller radar cross section, but less maneuverability and "prototype maturity"
than the F-22A? I would say absolutely. Would we be better off today with a
more numerous inventory of ATBs, albeit ones that feature slightly less range
and payload capacity? Undoubtedly.

The opportunity presented by Senior Peg may be long gone, but let's at least learn from our past and commit to
build a new bomber that we can afford in decent numbers, instead of one that comes at high cost because it is loaded
with every "factory option" available, including an extra bomb rack, a slightly bigger gas tank and features little bit better fuel economy...

A very special thanks to Scott Lowther for supplying these marvelous forensic line drawings of Senior Peg and Senior Ice. I highly recommend that you go view Scott's other work over at his website www.aerospaceprojectsreview.com

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